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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

Warsaw on August 6.55 Stalin had promised the Polish Premier to bring
help to the city,, but he obviously came to the conclusion that it would be
illogical to help this Polish Home Army in Warsaw when so many of its
troops had already been disarmed by the Red Army.
Moscow used the e Lublin Committee 5 as its mouth-piece to justify
its inactivity during this period and, on the 6th of August, its representa-
tives Osubka and Lyzvmsld-Zymierski, declared " that there was no
rising in Warsaw." But when the World Press began to emphasise the
magnitude of this battle, the Soviets were forced to recognise the facts
that Warsaw was fighting. The c Committee * put forward accusations
< that the rising was premature, and that they were unable to get informa-
tion as to where they were to drop the supplies, that it was indeed im-
possible to drop them since the insurgents were only occupying isolated
buildings.3
As recently as September 4, Pravda had expressed its disappointment
that Soviet aircraft were unable to drop supplies 6S for those victims of
the provocation still holding out in a few of the streets and houses in
Warsaw." When, in the middle of September, the Soviet Government
agreed to permit American aircraft carrying supplies for Wai saw to land
on the airfields of the American Eastern Command in the territory
occupied by the Red Army, the c Committee : reverted once again to the
line taken in the days before the uprising and began to incite Warsaw's
population to fight on and submit themselves to the " orders of one Polish
Commander-in-Chief." Aftei the unsuccessful attempt by the Red
Army to cross the Vistula, Moscow once more changed its attitude and
the ' Committee ' returned to the theme of an " ill-timed using., and the
irresponsibility of the Polish leaders in Warsaw, particularly General B6r."
As the outcome of Soviet-British pressure, General Sosnkowski had
been relieved of his post* and General Bor was made his successor, an
appointment which brought an outburst of fury from Moscow. Stalin
had demanded that Sosnkowski should be sacked, as by this move he
anticipated that the swift disruption of the Polish army and its subordina-
tion to his nominee Zymierski would only be a matter of time. The
nomination of Bor outwitted this manoeuvre. Marshal Stalin immedi-
ately, therefore on September 30, interviewed the Chairman of the Com-
mittee, Osubka, and the Commander, Zymierski, and on the following day,
the two men issued remarkable statements at a Press Conference in
Moscow, or rather, they seemed unusual statements to the Westerner.
Osubka declared :
** The Poles in London must be mad to appoint General Bor as C.-in-C.
of the armed forces under their control. In our opinion he is worse than
Sosnkowski.
" He is a war criminal.    By organising the premature uprising in Warsaw
*"That was a sacrifice", wrote The Spectator on October 6thj "and obviously
a hiimiliating sacrifice to Russian demands. It had been pressed on the Poles
by their friends in London . . ."
317